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FOREWORD: "RACIALISM" AND REASON 
Frank L Michelman* 
Clueless, I am not; but still I can wonder why I, of all people, 
was recruited to write a foreword for this symposium - sight un­
seen, before its component papers had even been submitted. 
Neither legal representation nor the teaching of it has ever been for 
me a main activity or focus of scholarly reflection. Although I have 
written occasionally about race - in defense of busing, 1 on the side 
of affirmative action2 - no one could mistake me for a critical race 
theorist. I am the original-model imperial scholar,3 as of last report 
only partially redeemed.4 "Liberal" is the usual name for the brand 
of legal theorist I think I am and certainly intend to be. But isn't 
"liberal" an opposite to "critical?" So what am I doing here? 
Okay, I'm publicly certifiable as a liberal who's been soft on 
critical race theory (CRT)- a liberal who for whatever reasons has 
been expressly receptive to some of the characteristic contentions 
of CRT5 and strongly supportive of its place at the legal academic 
spread.6 Still, why would anyone want to solicit for this space the 
kind of diplomatic hedging with CRT (or, worse, the sort of no­
blesse oblige patronization of it) that you'd have to expect from 
such a compromised character? Ulterior motives are not beyond 
imagining: someone could be thinking to jack up the symposium's 
cachet or circulation by getting my name on its cover. If so, lotsa 
luck. 
* Robert Walmsley Univ. Prof. of Law, Harvard University. B.A. 1957, Yale; LL.B 1960, 
Harvard. - Ed. 
1. See Frank I. Michelman, Boston, Busing and "Quality Education," NEW REPUBLIC, 
Oct. 26, 1974, at 8. 
2. See Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in Wil­
liam J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REv. 1261, 1290-306 (1991) [hereinaf­
ter Michelman, Super Liberal]. 
3. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561, 564-65 (1984). 
4. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider 
Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1360 n.38 (1992). 
5. See Michelman, Super Liberal, supra note 2, at 1297-303; Frank Michelman, Universi­
ties, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 339, 343-52 (1992). 
6. See Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical 
Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1019, 1023-24, 1051-52 (1991). I wrote a commendatory 
"blurb" for the back cover of CRm:CAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED 
THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
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I lean to a different .explanation for my invitation to be here: 
someone, I like to think, is pulling my chain. Someone got the idea 
that it would be interesting and fun to see what would happen if 
you took a bent-over-backwards liberal like me and locked him up 
(by a commitment to write a foreword) with a bunch of unvar­
nished calls to race-conscious social action that (someone thought) 
his liberal principles can't accept and his bleeding heart or PC re­
flex can't reject. Seems like a neat idea, too, although perhaps I'm 
not the one to say. Anyway, to find out how the guy's wheels come 
off - or maybe don't - read on. 
* * * 
To my (I'm afraid, incorrigibly modernist) cast of mind,7 what 
the essays in this symposium most significantly have in common is 
not any commitment of manner, method, or metatheory, manifest 
and important as such commitments are in them and in the larger 
CRT corpus. The central concern here, as I see it, is not narrativity 
or irony or deconstruction; not the social metaphysics of position, 
perspective, and the constructedness of consciousness (with related 
explanations of the persistent systemic effects of race in American 
life); not the nemesis of essentialism; and not even the issue of law's 
possible transcendence of politics or morality's of experience. 
These essays' most telling shared commitment, I find, is to a highly 
contentious proposition of moral substance, one that I shall call 
"the race proposition." 
To my understanding, the contentious CRT race proposition 
comes down roughly to the following. (1) Race in America is both 
real and socially (including legally) constructed; it is a real social 
phenomenon of groups constituted by projected and correlatively 
experienced relations among their memberships of superiority and 
inferiority, patronage and clientage, privilege and disprivilege. (2) 
7. Eric Yamamoto locates critical race theory in "the tension between postmodernism, 
with its despairing unpacking of liberal legalism, and modernism, with its concepts of truth 
and justice that for people of color 'have always been both indispensable and inadequate."' 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in 
Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 821, 829 {1997) (quoting Angela P. Harris, Fore­
word: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL L. REv. 741, 744 (1994)), Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., somewhat similarly juxtaposes "endorsement of the discourse of rights" with 
"exposure" of law's "legacy of . . .  colonialism and racism," as pedagogical aims for a Critical 
Race Practice Clinic, although a question remains of the relation between the liberal-individ­
ualist "concepts of truth and justice" to which Yamamoto and Harris probably refer and the 
group rights of cultural preservation that are of especial concern to Williams. Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95 MICH. L. REv. 741, 762-65 
{1997). 
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Those projections and relations and their material correlates are a 
grave affront to justice, against which legal actors - lawmakers, 
judges and jurors, legal advocates and counselors, teachers and 
scholars of law - morally ought to direct their practices, pragmati­
cally (to that end) sometimes differentiating by race their responses 
to the situations and claims of the various groups and their mem­
bers. (3) In the conduct of their (broadly speaking) public transac­
tions, therefore, it is sometimes morally right (although it is also 
sometimes morally wrong, possibly depending on racial variables) 
for legal actors to advert consciously, in thought or in utterance, to 
the matter of race and to the racial identities of the population 
groups, parties, clients, students, and readers with whom they deal, 
not to mention of the self. "'Race cognizance' . . becomes . . an 
anti-racist strategy."8 · (4) It is therefore morally wrong to demand 
that legal norms be tightly bound to an aim or ideal of.colorblind­
ness in the (broadly speaking) public or "civil" transactions of econ­
omy, society, and politics. 
If you wanted an unendearing term for the CRT race proposi­
tion, would "racialist" do? Some leading race crits use this term 
specifically - and pejoratively, to name something to which they 
stand opposed - to mean us-against-them race-favoritism or race­
loyalty.9 In The Bloods and the Crits, a recent eye-openingly caustic 
and, as the title conveys, supremely antagonistic review of CRT,10 
Jeffrey Rosen applies "racialism" less strictly, sometimes to CRT 
compendiously and directly11 and sometimes to the alleged ten­
dency of its teachings.12 In Rosen's usage, the term extends to ad­
vocacy of sometimes taking race expressly into account in 
determinations of how someone is to be treated or judged.13 It also 
covers the urging of certain sociological claims from which that ad-
8. Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 965, 989 (1997). Cahn continues: 
Through race cognizance, whites self-consciously recognize [that race makes a difference 
in people 's livesj ... but do not believe that racial difference leads to inferiority .... 
[T]hinking carefully about the relevance of race need not lead to racism or essentialism. 
Id. 
9. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CrunCAL RACE THEORY: THE 
KEY WRITINGS 'IHAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT at xxxi-xxxii (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 
1995) (opposing "racialism" among blacks while generally advocating anti-racist race­
consciousness). 
10. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Blood and the Crits, NEw REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27. 
11. See id. at 28 (speaking of "the critical race scholars' racialism"). 
12. See id. at 31 ("Attacking racism, these scholars promote racialism."). 
13. See id. at 42 (contrasting the bad "racialism" of "[a]scribing the sympathetic attributes 
of victimhood to a defendant [in a criminal trial] because of his race" and the good "color­
blindness" that justice commands). 
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vocacy proceeds: of persistent systemic racism in America14 and of 
a gap between the perceptions of whites in general and blacks in 
general about many matters of race.1s Now, "racialist" may sound 
like "racist," but Rosen is scrupulous about the difference: 
although, in his view, '�racialist" social analysis and advocacy are 
morally suspect because they tend to invite or accommodate injus­
tice,16 he is clear that not all racialist talk is racist, apparently be­
cause not all such talk proceeds from conscious racial prejudice, 
hostility, or hatred. "Racialism" thus employed is nevertheless a 
danger to reasoned debate, always willy-nilly tending to insinuate 
what it denies. As Peggy Russell says of "playing the race card," its 
use irresistibly tends to impugn the morality and good faith of "the 
'race-talking' advocate. "17 
Why do I call the race proposition the "most telling" commit­
ment that the articles here, and by extension the works of the CRT 
corpus at large, have in common? Because I believe the deflation 
of colorblindness in which the race proposition issues is the factor 
fueling the :fieriest opposition to CRT that I find in the liberal 
quarters I frequent. I take as exemplary Rosen's Bloods and 
Crits.1s Consider that essay's stage-setting and tone-setting charac­
terization of the CRT corpus: "Rejecting the achievements of the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s as epiphenomena!," Rosen be­
gins, "critical race scholars argue that the dismantling of the appa­
ratus of formal segregation failed to purge American society of its 
endemic racism, or to improve the social status of African Ameri­
cans in discernible or lasting ways."19 
"Reject?" "Epiphenomenal?" "Discernible?" I am sure that 
Rosen, who was not writing a scholarly tome, could and did find 
fairly citeable support in the CRT corpus before publishing that 
sentence. Yet I do not find the account very "nuanced" - to apply 
here the standard to which Rosen rightly holds his scholarly 
14. See id. at 28 (apparently applying "racialism" to Judge Leon Higginbotham's "analy­
sis" of persistent systemic racism in the American legal system). 
15. See id. at 30-31, 34 (applying "racialist" to the "descriptive claims of critical race the­
ory . .. [of] a jarring gap in perceptions between whites and blacks"). 
16. See id. at 30-34. 
17. See Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race-Cards": Black Attorneys and 
the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REv. 766, 792 (1997) (discussing "playing the 
race card" and observing that "the not-so-subtle implication is that talking about race has 
turned into a matter of sophistry, gamesmanship, and hyperbole"). 
18. See Rosen, supra note 10. 
19. Id. at 27. 
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reviewees.20 To my reading, race crits - who to be sure� are no 
monolith - by no means prevailingly reject or belittle either the 
historical aims or the historic accomplishments of "formal" desegre­
gation and the Movement. Rather they prevailingly honor them, 
embrace them, find to their anger and dismay that the country has 
failed to stay the course on which they launched us, and seek expla­
nations for that fact that might eventually point a way to overcome 
it.21 If so, then the real fighting issue between Rosen and CRT isn't 
the apparent borderline lunacy of disparaging civil rights but rather 
the gross repugnancy to liberal ideals, as Rosen takes them to be, of 
CRT's complexi:fication of the relations among colorblindness, civil 
rights, and justice.22 The liberal family quarrel (which you will re­
peatedly see surfacing in what follows) between Rosen's reactions 
and mine, his readings and mine, might then be in some measure 
explainable by the fact that I, as I shall explain below, think he is in 
this instance mistaken about liberal ideals. 
I don't say that the colorblindness issue exhausts liberal objec­
tions to the scholarly methods and professions of CRT. With rea­
son, in my view, many liberals plead for caution in the uses of 
"stories" (as opposed to just the facts, ma'am) in moral, political, 
and legal argument - or, worse, in place of it. Few, however, 
would deny either the power of frankly fictional stories to test and 
20. See id. at 28 (criticizing an author for "neglect [of] a great deal of countervailing 
evidence and ... slight[ing] important nuances that might complicate his argument about the 
centrality of racism in American law"). 
21. See Crenshaw et al., supra note 9, at xiii, xiv-xv (a volume listed among those under 
review in Rosen's essay); Crenshaw and her co-authors observe: 
Our opposition to traditional civil rights discourse is neither a criticism of the civil rights 
movement nor an attempt to diminish its significance. On the contrary, . . •  we draw 
much of our inspiration and sense of direction from that courageous, brilliantly con­
ceived, spiritually inspired, and ultimately transformative mass action. 
Of course, colored people made important social gains through civil rights reform, as 
did American society generally . . . . The law's incorporation of what several authors 
here call "formal equality" ... marks a decidedly progressive moment in U.S. political 
and social history. However, the fact that civil rights advocates met with some success in 
the nation's courts and legislatures ought not obscure the central role the American legal 
order played in the deradicalization of racial liberation movements. Along with the sup­
pression of explicit white racism (the widely celebrated aim of civil rights reform), the 
dominant legal conception of racism as a discrete and identifiable act of "prejudice 
based on skin color" placed virtually the entire range of everyday social practices in 
America - social practices developed and maintained throughout the period of formal 
American apartheid - beyond the scope of critical examination or legal remediation. 
Id. 
22. "The prestige of color-blindness is diminishing in America, and not only among peo­
ple of color. This is a disaster. For we will be blind to color or we will be blind to justice." 
Rosen, supra note 10, at 42. 
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clarify moral and legal beliefs,23 or, in a litigation setting, our utter 
dependence on narrative for the precipitation of normatively signif­
icant "facts" out of welters of sense-impressions and empirical re­
ports. As for nonfictional stories in place of argument, what about 
res ipsa loquitur and the Brandeis brief? 
Many liberals have their doubts, too, about the weight and ef­
fects in the United States now of "past" or "societal" discrimina­
tion, of "structural" or "institutional" racial hierarchy, and of 
"unconscious" racial prejudice or hatred. These may be fairly de­
batable questions, but if so they are debatable as matters of concept 
and fact that cannot in themselves be furious fighting issues for us 
denizens of the empire of reason. "Societal" and "structural" and 
"unconscious" racism are perfectly intelligible notions, and claims 
of their applicability to the United States now are not, I daresay, 
honestly dismissible out of hand as unreasonable or disingenuous: 
If you were to hear today at the water cooler about some ambigu­
ously pigmented fellow, not of your acquaintance, who has been 
"passing" at your firm or faculty or company, would it occur to you 
to ask "as which race?" or to say that you simply couldn't fathom 
his motives? For all his disparagement, as trans-factual, of CRT's 
"central premise" that nonwhite lives suffer widespread harm from 
a denigratory race-consciousness that is "institutional and en­
demic," not confined to discrete "acts of intentional discrimina­
tion,"24 Jeffrey Rosen offers not the slightest rebuttal to the premise 
that I can see, beyond a ringing and risible declaration that the life 
of Judge Leon Higginbotham "refutes" it.is He offers instead the 
form of response that lawyers know as demur-and-avoid and others 
23. A classic example for lawyers would be Billy Budd. See RoBERT M. COVER, JusncE 
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 2-6 (1975). This point is obscured by 
Rosen's one-sided dispatch of storytelling: 
Stories do not appeal to reason; they usurp it. Reasoned arguments depend on things 
such as truth, evidence, logic, objectivity and the rest of the anachronistic apparatus of 
the critical mind. Stories, by contrast, appeal to the heart. They are designed to edify, 
and to confirm the prejudices of a community of listeners. For this reason, stories are a 
primary instrument of identity. 
Rosen, supra note 10, at 40. 
24. See id. at 39. 
25. See id. at 28. Compare id. at 39 (describing as from "a world that [has] transcended 
facts" the views that "racism is institutional and endemic" and that "there is no need to prove 
individual acts of intentional discrimination to establish that an African American . . •  has 
been victimized by racism") with Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Thirteenth Chronicle: Legal 
Formalism and Law's Discontents, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1144 (1997) ("Formalism • • .  
makes you . . .  recite things you know are not true - that racism exists only when it is 
intended . • . .  "). Rosen points to the willingness of American appellate courts to intervene 
against overtly racist acts. See Rosen, supra note 10, at 30. That is no answer to the CRT 
premise, which is, of course, precisely that of an institutional racism whose extent and effects 
far exceed the kinds of expression of it that colorblind law can remedy. 
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know as changing the subject: The premise of institutional racism 
carries normative and prescriptive implications at odds with liberal 
ideals of colorblindness and individual responsibility, and for that 
reason cannot be entertained in legal argument. And there, after 
all, is the point: I am myself right here and now entertaining the 
premise as a sociological theory. Whether my doing so draws lib­
eral polemical fire down around my head will depend completely 
on whether I do or do not go on stoutly to add "but our Constitu­
tion, notwithstanding, is and ought to be colorblind." 
Denials of cogency to reasoned arguments in morals and law are 
something else. They would indeed pose direct threats to political 
and legal liberalism. They do not, however, explain the energy of a 
polemic like Rosen's. Liberal thought truly cannot accommodate 
the view that questions of political and legal justice have no answers 
of reason and principle but only of desire and power. As a reader 
can doubtless tell, I (liberally) want to resist attribution of that view 
to CRT.26 But my point for the moment is different: this "indeter­
minacy" issue is an old one. Liberal jurisprudes have long con­
tested it with nonrace crits and other adversaries. These days they 
tend to do so coolly, in elaborately philosophical ways.27 It is hard 
to think that, decoupled from the race proposition, the late appear­
ance of one more branch of academic legal indeterminism ( assum­
ing that is what CRT is) would have opened a hot new front in the 
culture wars. 
We return, then, to the race proposition,28 and now we should 
take the trouble to notice precisely the respects in which its claims 
are contentious. Advocacy of (some) race-consciousness in legal 
norms themselves - as opposed to in the civil transactions that 
legal norms aim to standardize - would not as such be contentious 
in American legal culture. Laws prohibiting express or intentional 
discrimination and segregation by race - by the government ever, 
and by anyone in various civil transactions - are race-conscious by 
any definition. Such laws make an issue of race. They cannot be 
26. Compare Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racia/ized Crimi­
nal Defenses, 95 MlcH. L. REv. 1063, 1090 (1997) ("[T]he postmodern politics of norrnativity 
problematizes ... moral aspiration .... [Moral aspiration] must 'presuppose that objectively 
correct answers exist and that there is an impartial position from which to distinguish legiti­
mate from illegitimate uses of power.' ") (quoting Eric Blumenson, Mapping the Limits of 
Skepticism in Law and Morals, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 523, 529 (1996)) with Delgado, supra note 
25, at 1144 ("Formalism ... makes you lie - profess beliefs, for example, in ... [the Jaw's] 
internal consistency, and in the underlying coherence of contradictory platitudes."). 
27. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & 
Pus. AFF. 87 (1996). 
28. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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applied without ascertainment of someone's race - or at least 
someone's belief about someone's race. They grant "special rights" 
against race-based gradings and sortings of individuals - as com­
pared, say, with gradings and sortings based on law school attended, 
which also may be very arbitrary.29 They are historically rooted in 
perceptions of injustice suffered especially by nonwhites and every­
where understood as interventions on the especial behalf of non­
whites although not their behalf exclusively.30 Premised as they are 
on fiat rejection of the possibility that separated could ever in the 
foreseeable future be equal in American civil society, responding as 
they thus do to entrenched social awareness of hierarchized racial 
differentiation, antidiscrimination laws may quite plausibly be held 
to contribute toward - even if they also in other respects work 
against - the normalization of race hierarchy in American life.31 
Antidiscrimination laws are thus neatly "racialist," and they 
grant "special rights" to boot, and indeed these facts about them 
prompt objection to both their moral permissibility and their practi­
cal utility by critics whose sincerity and rationality in general I see 
29. Antidiscrimination laws depart from a default position of (1) a supposed normal free­
dom of people who are not public officials to select, judge, and grade those with whom they 
deal in civil and economic affairs on whatever grounds they find relevant to their desires and 
purposes, and (2) a supposed normal responsibility of public officials to judge and grade 
those with whom they officially interact on whatever grounds they rationally find relevant to 
the public's purposes. Consider a prosecutor who, knowing that black jurors are less likely 
than white ones to send a black man to jail, seeks to keep blacks off the jury that will try a 
black defendant whose guilt of criminal violence is definitely known to the prosecutor by a 
mountain of inadmissible but quite credible confessions and corroborating evidence. See 
Batson v. Kentucky, 106 U.S. 1712 (1986) (holding race-conscious juror challenges unconsti­
tutional); Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice 
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 689 (1995) (affirming the fact that black jurors are more likely 
than white ones to acquit black defendants). 
30. This understanding applies to the equal protection clause itself, of course, as mani­
fested by the Supreme Court's adoption of a "suspect classification" doctrine and its impulse, 
when deciding the "suspectness" of a legal classification such as sex, alienage, or "illegiti­
macy" to compare that classification with color. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 685 (1973) ("[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our soci­
ety was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave 
codes . . . .  [I]t can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex 
characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in 
our educational institutions, in the job market and . . .  in the political arena."); cf. Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) ("[D]iscrimination against illegitimates has never approached 
the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and political discrimination against women 
and Negroes."). But cf. Yamamoto, supra note 7, at 861 (writing of Justices who have "used 
America's multiracial demographics and the existence of interminority competition and con­
flict to transform whites . . . into 'just another group competing with many others"') (quoting 
Alexandra Natapoff, Note, Trouble in Paradise: Equal Protection and the Dilemma of In­
terminority Group Conflict, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1995)). 
31. Cf. Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and 
Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REv. 901, 932 (1997) ("To be colorblind 
assumes that one notices race, but then 'chooses' not to notice it and can do so without the 
first noticing influencing the interaction."). 
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no reason to question.32 Laws exceptionally excluding race33 from 
the grounds on which we are free to select and grade and sort our 
civil-transactional partners are nevertheless overwhelmingly and 
unhesitatingly approved as right by American lawyers and the pop­
ulation at large. Evidently, most Americans believe that this much 
race-consciousness in the laws is required for the pursuit of justice 
in the public social, economic, and political transactions for which 
law sets the standard. Perhaps there is a touch of CRT in us all. 
What is contentious is not acceptance by race crits of (some) 
race-consciousness within the law. What is contentious is their re­
jection of the pursuit by law of colorblindness in society outside the 
law - not as such but as a sovereign test for the rightness of all 
laws. Not rejection of the pursuit as such, because race crits stand 
unitedly and righteously opposed to allowing social and civic trans­
actions ever to be guided by a presumption of someone's worth be­
cause white or defect because nonwhite, and many if not all of them 
rightly do so with absolute zero tolerance for ostensibly rational, 
experience-based, instrumental reasons for such conduct.34 Their 
protest, then, must be against the overriding immorality of the con­
duct, no doubt in view of the human devastation that it wreaks. 
These theorists, in other words, while rejecting constancy in the 
pursuit of social-transactional colorblindness as an overriding re­
quirement for legal norms, do not sweepingly reject a place for col­
orblindness in social transactions. Apparently it is not 
colorblindness per se that CRT rejects as a standard for social trans­
actions - colorblindness in its place, as we might say - but rather 
refusals to consider race when to do so would serve justice.35 As I 
say, the race proposition is one of moral substance. 
32. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 7-12 (1992). 
33. It is no answer that they also dictate exceptions for nationality, ethnicity, sex, religion, 
and disability. 
34. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal Profes­
sion: A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 Mrctt. L. REv. 1005 (1997); Patricia Williams, 
Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to 
Racism, 42 MIAMI L. REv. 127, 127-30 (1987); supra note 29. Would any race crit approve a 
prosecutor's use of peremptories against blacks as such? One might also consider the case of 
the affirmative-action appointee denied the presumption of ability that normally attends the 
fact of appointment to the post, see Williams, supra note 7, at 744, although the rationality of 
such denials is contestable, see Margaret Jane Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric, in REAS· 
SESSING CML RroHrS (Jeffrey Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1991); 
Johnson, supra, at 1014-16. 
35. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 34, at 1052 (distinguishing justifiable affirmative action 
from "first order discrimination" against "people of color on the basis that they are biologi­
cally or culturally inferior to whites"); Russell, supra note 18, at 785 (questioning "an overly 
rigid adherence to notions of 'colorblindness' in lawyering strategy"). 
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What is the logical status of the race proposition in CRT? 
Loose talk of "racialism" and "essentialism" could suggest to the 
unwary that race crits prevailingly see race loyalty or race favorit­
ism as an unconditioned moral a priori.36 They could seem to por­
tray CRT as arbitrarily, and very peculiarly, starting with a platonic 
conception of a Good that requires a world replete with occasion 
for the exercise of racial attachments and loyalties - so that if the 
social phenomenon of race itself were to perish from the earth that 
would in the view of CRT be a moral catastrophe. But of course 
the CRT race proposition is not a priori or foundational but rather 
is an outcome of argument proceeding, as far as I can see, from an 
utterly banal precept of justice, to wit: neither social suffering nor 
indignity nor disadvantage nor their opposites ought in any mea­
sure to be dealt on the basis, or be predictable from the knowledge, 
of a person's inferior or superior location in any hierarchy of 
whatever society constructs as race. 
Now, if race-linked privilege is any essential part of your com­
plaint, then inducement of the perishing or deflation or  
"destabilization" or  "deconstruction" of  race itself must logically 
qualify as a remedy.37 Within the corpus of CRT, I see neither pre­
vailing hostility to such a remedy nor, pace Rosen, prevailing rejec­
tion of it as impossible.38 I see what appear to be representative 
instances of receptivity to the remedy in principle39 and the positive 
pursuit of it in scholarship.40 I do, of course, also see insistence that 
it's not that easy; that it won't soon be wrought in any case, and 
never under ideologized prohibition of conscious and deliberate 
reference to race from the legal and civil transactions of judges and 
36. See Rosen, supra note 10, at 30 ("The view that blacks experience racism as normal 
rather than exceptional leads some critical race scholars to a vulgar racial essentialism. The 
daily experience of racism, they hold, leads blacks to perceive particular events in American 
law and culture differently than whites, and so those who dissent from the black perspective 
are not really black. Attacking racism, these scholars promote racialism. Perhaps the thrall 
of essentialism helps to explain the vehemence of Higginbotham's obsessive attacks on Jus­
tice Clarence Thomas . . . .  "). 
37. See Johnson, supra note 34, at 1048, 1042 (speaking of "the destabilization of racial 
identity" that, "if achieved, can eliminate existing racial identities and any impermissible ben­
efits that flow from existing patterns of racial domination"). 
38. Cf. Rosen, supra note 10, at 27 ("The claim that these scholars make is not only 
political; it is also epistemological. Our perception of facts, they maintain, is contingent on 
our racially defined experiences; and, since the white majority can never transcend its racist 
perspectives, formally neutral laws will continue to fuel white domination. The prevailing 
mood is fatalism."). 
39. See , e.g. , Butler, supra note 29, at 725; Crenshaw et al., supra note 9, at xxxi-xxxii 
(opposing expressly both "racialism" and "essentialism"). 
40. See , e. g. , IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE 30-31, 33, 176, 187-88, 194-95 (1996); Johnson, supra note 34, passim. 
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juries, advocates and counselors, and teachers and scholars of law; 
and - the crucial bone of contention - that in the American pres­
ent such a prohibition, a pretense to the dissolution of race without 
the reality of it, is itself on balance a net contributing cause to daily 
injustice and its reproduction. 
Some CRT sources contain calls to the defense and preservation 
of Black or African-American culture.41 These seem no more fairly 
attackable as "racialist" than the Saint Patrick's Day parade. Shall 
we invoke "the wages of racialism"42 as a reason to deny to Ameri­
can Africanists what is cheerfully permitted to American cultural 
nationalists of every other description? Would that be the implica­
tion of judicial holdings that race in particular (but compare party, 
machine politics, incumbent-protection, cultural likeness) can never 
be a noticeably influential factor in legislative districting?43 The 
sources also contain grapplings with wrenching questions: of the 
choice by criminal defense counsel to use or not use "racialized" 
defenses that may procure an acquittal at the cost of conspiring in 
justice-disserving social constructions of race;44 and of the special 
obligations of blacks in the legal system to consider race in the pur­
suit of justice.45 Here we find Paul Butler's much-publicized propo­
sal that black jurors in particular ought in certain circumstances to 
acquit black accuseds who appear to them to be guilty as charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt.46 
Like Jeffrey Rosen, I react negatively to Butler's proposal. Not, 
however, because it dares to conceive of justice and of America in 
ways that could possibly warrant race-conscious jury nullification in 
some cases. My problem is that Butler's call for such action is ad­
dressed specifically and apparently only to blacks. By contrast, 
both Anthony Alfieri and Naomi Cahn, in their essays below, sup­
port an "ethic" or "responsibility" of race-consciousness in legal ad­
vocacy without reference to the advocate's race. If there are 
considerations of justice in support of race-conscious jury nullifica­
tion, why would they not be valid for jurors of all races? Butler 
does not say. The omission is important, because it invites -
41. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," in CREN-
SHAW ET AL., supra note 9, at 257, 271-72; Johnson, supra note 34, at 1044-50. 
42. Rosen, supra note 10, at 34. 
43. Cf. Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). 
44. See Alfieri, supra note 26; Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 CoLUM. 
L. RE.v. 1301, 1307-08 (1995); Cahn, supra note 8, at 995-98. 
45. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 8, at 993-95; Russell, supra note 17, at 785-88. 
46. See Butler, supra note 29. 
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although it certainly does not necessitate47 - a reading of his arti­
cle as a call to race loyalty, which is not the same thing as a call to 
justice. 
On what possible grounds might one take issue with the CRT 
race proposition, understood as a call to justice? I am supposing 
that one accepts the banal precept of the absolute moral intolerabil­
ity of race-linked social privilege and disprivilege. In order, then, to 
reject the CRT race proposition you might: (1) deny that in our 
country now there is any such thing to speak of, or (2) maintain that 
a combination of laws and social pressures against express or inten­
tional race-based discrimination can adequately control the cyclical 
reproduction of materially consequential, racially constructed privi­
lege· and disprivilege. I do not myself see how anyone's unshaken 
confidence in either of those contentions can withstand honest en­
gagement with the corpus of CRT.48 Informed, impassioned, liberal 
opposition to CRT must draw from a further apprehension of some­
thing positively abhorrent in CRT's partial rejection of colorblind­
ness in legal and civil transactions. Something, I mean, on the order 
of an intolerable clash between such a rejection and liberally un­
compromiseable principles of political justice and right. 
What principles? Jeffrey Rosen cites the naked principle of 
civil-transactional colorblindness itself, apparently regarded as an 
unconditioned liberal a priori. 49 He also cites the principle of the 
rule of law.50 Invocations of the rule of law against CRT can have 
multiple meanings. They may refer to the nonneutrality - the out­
right partialism - of CRT's stance toward colorblindness: being 
nonwhite is not allowed to count against you ever, but sometimes it 
can count in your favor, even in competition with whites. To invoke 
against that stance the need for ruleness and "principle" in the law 
is obviously to beg the question of the moral apriorization of color­
blindness itself. Racially partialist deviation from colorblindness is 
lawless only because and insofar as the law prohibits it, which is just 
what CRT is contesting; but a law permitting such deviation would 
not on that account alone be unprincipled, except in the possible 
sense in which "unprincipled" means unjust - to assert which 
47. See id. at 725. 
'48. In the following collection, see especially Dorothy Roberts, Unshackling Black Moth· 
erhood, 95 MICH. L. REv. 938 (1997). 
49. "The prestige of color-blindness is diminishing in America, and not only among peo­
ple of color. This is a disaster. For we will be blind to color or Wj:l will be blind to justice." 
Rosen, supra note 10, at 42. 
50. See id. at 27. 
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would be tantamount to equating justice a priori with colorblind­
ness in the law. 
What logic could possibly warrant such an equation? Legal col­
orblindness has, to be sure, the perfect form of a practical principle 
(that is, a principle respecting what is to be done). Obviously, how­
ever, not all formally perfect practical principles are consonant with 
justice. That could not be, because there are limitless numbers of 
formally conceivable practical principles, that can conflict in their 
applications to a context or state of affairs. A principle that would, 
in some proposed application to a given context, defeat a conceded 
principle of justice for that context cannot itself be a principle of 
justice as thus applied in that context.51 
Now, CRT has an argument that such is indeed the case with the 
principle of colorblindness as relentlessly applied to the American 
social context. Its application in that ·way, the argument runs, 
defeats the precept of justice - to repeat it - that neither social 
suffering nor indignity nor disadvantage nor their opposites ought 
in any measure to be dealt on the basis, or be predictable from the 
knowledge, of a person's inferior or superior location in any hierar­
chy of whatever society constructs as race. That right there is a 
principle, folks, in case you hadn't noticed. It is also the moral ma­
jor premise of an argument contra colorblindness. Reject the prem­
ise if you will. Or show the falsity of some other premise in the 
argument, such as the sociological premise of systemic racism -
the falsity, not the inferential obnoxiousness to some conclusion 
you favor. Or find some fault in CRT's chains of inference from the 
premises to the anti-colorblindness conclusion.52 Those are the 
only ways in all liberal reason to defeat an argument you do not 
like; it's just not done by nakedly reviling the conclusion.53 
51. In other words: Stanl,ey Fish was right when he said toward the end of his recent Op­
Ed that the choice posed by affinnative action "is not between the principled and the non­
principled. It is between [so-called] neutral principles, which refuse to acknowledge the di­
lemmas we face as a society, and moral principles, which begin with an awareness of those 
dilemmas and demand that we address them." Stanley Fish, When Principles Get In The 
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1996, at A15. Fish began that same Op-Ed by making "principle" 
unmodified the culprit because, he said, "a principle scorns actual historical circumstances 
and moves quickly to a level of generalization and abstraction so high that the facts of history 
can no longer be seen." Id. Wrong. Only bad or inept principles do. Good "moral" ones do 
not. Fish knows this, and said so before he was done. 
52. Cf. Shelby Steele, Indoctrination Isn't Teaching, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1997, at A33 
(accepting premise of systemic racism but rejecting inference that teaching Ebonics is a good 
idea). 
' · 
53. You can use the i:epugnancy of the conclusion to force reconsideration of the prem­
ises - see, for example, JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 46-53 (1971) (explaining "re­
flective equilibrium") - but in the end the conclusion sticks if the premises do and you find 
no fault with the logic. 
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There is, however, another less formal and more formidable way 
to understand liberal invocations of "the rule of law" against CRT. 
The more formidable charge is that CRT or some of its adherents, 
specifically through dalliance with the indeterminist school of legal 
criticism, attacks and corrodes the rule of democratic law - or, in 
other words, the general willingness of aggrieved fractions of the 
American population to seek relief within and not outside the chan­
nels of peaceful democratic politics and honest judicial enforcement 
of whatever legislation results. At stake in this charge are values of 
the utmost concern to liberalism: a nonoppressive civil peace, the 
maintenance or restoration of minimally acceptable levels of civil 
respect and other goods of political community and harmony, gen­
eral confidence that basically fair terms of social cooperation 
among conflicting interests and visions are pursued and upheld in 
good faith, and, ultimately, the stability of a political regime that in 
its fundamentals is deemed to be morally worth saving. 
Jeffrey Rosen understandably believes that these values are 
placed under strain not only by calls to black jurors, as black, to 
take the law into their own hands but also - although perhaps not 
in every instance nearly so severely - by calls to us all for any sort 
of ostensibly "reverse-discriminatory" practice in the law. That be­
lief is no more reasonably dismissible out of hand than the claim of 
systemic racism. Systemic racism is not, after all, the only sociologi­
cal fact that there is. The sincere, convinced embrace by many of 
the commanding morality of colorblindness is another. 
Lacking both wisdom and space to deal adequately with this is­
sue, I confine myself to one aspect of it. Rosen traces to a specific 
cause what he sees as the willingness of some theorists to risk with 
"racialist" advocacy the future of democracy's rule in America. The 
cause, in his view, lies in the kind of antiliberalism that consists in 
repudiation of the possibility of there being any sort of political and 
legal rule that is not just a disguised play of arbitrary power. I be­
lieve, to the contrary, that the problem has its roots not outside 
liberal thought but within it. 
A political regime, liberals say, is constituted by the fundamen­
tal laws that fix its "constitutional essentials" - charter its popular­
govemmental and representative-governmental institutions and of­
fices and define and limit their respective powers and jurisdic­
tions.54 Among the contents of the fundamental laws that 
constitute· a political regime may be an entrenchment of certain 
54. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERAUSM 227-28 {1993). 
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rights of persons against ordinary lawmaking. Any such enumera­
tion of entrenched human rights - and by "enumeration" I of 
course mean to include major interpretations such as that of "the 
equal protection of the laws" to mean colorblind law - is likely at 
any time to be deeply and reasonably controversial within the pop­
ulation. You can find examples all over contemporary constitu­
tional law. 
The endemic controversy of basic-rights entrenchments and in­
terpretations points to a more general truth: Any established polit­
ical order, constituted by a set of fundamental laws, contains an 
irreducible element of coerciveness vis-a-vis what liberalism holds 
to be the ideally and primordially free, autonomous, and equal indi­
viduals within range of its authority. Liberals accordingly say that 
in order for this coercion to comport with justice, it must at least be 
the case that everyone concerned has true reasons of his or her 
own, whether or not consciously held, for agreeing to its terms -
reasons that everyone would discover themselves to have in a wide 
and general reflective equilibrium,55 reasons that are objectively 
consonant with everyone's system of interests (including interests 
they presumptively have in fair and peaceful social co-existence or 
cooperation with others), or that are in accord with what everyone 
would agree to, according to their understandings of their interests, 
in the light of a truly democratic debate.56 
Now suppose we shift slightly the question under consideration. 
From the question - call it the question of justice - of a given 
regime's actual consonance with justice in the liberally defined 
sense of everyone's having reason of their own to agree whether 
they know it or not, we move to the question - call it the question 
of legitimacy - of the moral justifiability of supporting the regime, 
including its coercive apparatus, in the face of actual unliquidated 
disagreement among individuals and population groups about 
whether the regime really does satisfy justice. These two questions 
are obviously related in some way, but they are not identical, or at 
any rate liberals had better hope that they are not. 
That is because of what I shall call (in the manner of John 
Rawls) the fact of reasonable interpretative pluralism - the fact, 
that is, of inevitable irresolvable uncertainty and irreparable rea­
sonable disagreement among inhabitants of a modem country 
about the entrenchments and interpretations of human rights that 
55. See id. at 8, 28, 95-97. 
56. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACIS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DIS­
COURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107, 447-48, 459, 566 n.15 (1996). 
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justice truly requires in the country's historical circmnstances.57 If 
we strictly followed Rawls, we would take reasonable interpretative 
pluralism to be one of those social facts - Rawls calls them "cir­
cmnstances of justice" - that bear crucially upon people's reasons 
for agreeing or not to one or another set of public practical norms 
and thereby affect the very content of justice.ss But, I want to sug­
gest, the fact of reasonable interpretative pluralism cuts deeper. 
This fact makes nondemonstrable by public reasoning any authori­
tative truth about what it is that everyone has reason to agree to in 
the matter of legal hmnan-rights entrenchments and interpreta­
tions. It doesn't make truth in this matter philosophically unavaila­
ble, or beyond reasoned argmnent, or just a matter of opinion or 
desire or power; it makes it politically unavailable among people 
who, aware of hmnan frailty and "the burdens of judgment," all 
sharing belief that there is a truth of the matter, can neither all 
agree on what that is nor dismiss as unreasonable their opponents' 
positions.59 The fact of reasonable interpretative pluralism thus 
opens a gap between the question of justice and the question of 
legitimacy, of what it would be morally right or justifiable for any­
one to be doing about this matter of political coercion. What is 
more and what is worse, liberals by affirming reasonable pluralism 
present themselves with the possibility that there is no answer at all 
to the question of what it would be right for anyone or any society 
to be doing about this matter - or, in other words, that nothing 
that is done about it can be right or morally justifiable, that all there 
can be is facts of power. This is precisely what John Rawls calls 
"the problem of political liberalism. "60 
57. On "the fact of reasonable pluralism," see RAWLS, supra note 54, at 36-37. 
58. See id. at 66. The fact of reasonable pluralism, for example, gives people reasons for 
accepting entrenched norms of toleration that they might not otherwise have. 
59. John Rawls calls "burdens of judgment" the causes of unliquidatable disagreement 
about justice among persons who, as reasonable, all observe and report honestly, argue co­
gently, and share a "desire to honor fair terms of cooperation." RAWLS, supra note 54, at 55. 
Among the causes he posits is the following: 
To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral 
and political values is shaped by our total [life] experience, • . •  and our total experiences 
must always differ. Thus, in a modem society with its numerous offices and positions, its 
various divisions of labor, its many social groups and their ethnic variety, citizens' total 
experiences are disparate enough for their judgments to diverge, at least to some degree, 
on many if not most cases of any significant complexity. 
Id. at 56-57. Compare Jeffrey Rosen's rejection, as fantasy-world and as "vulgar essential­
ism," of claims that "the daily experience of racism . . .  leads blacks to perceive particular 
events in American law and culture differently than whites" and that "our perceptions of 
facts is racially contingent." See Rosen, supra note 10, at 30-31. 
60. See RAWLS, supra note 54, at xviii. 
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For liberals, this grim conclusion must be avoidable. But how 
do we escape it? If we can, it can only be by our being able to 
identify some possible attribute in a currently prevailing set of 
human-rights entrenchments and interpretations, other than the rea­
sonably contested attribute of actual congruence with justice, that 
could underwrite the moral justifiability of acts in support of a coer­
cive political regime that contains this set of entrenchments and in­
terpretations. But then what could this other attribute be? 
One might liberally think that acts in support of a prevailing set 
of human-rights prescriptions are morally justified as long as there 
is something about the set in virtue of which everyone is able to 
observe and abide by what it contains, not just out of desire to 
avoid l�gally administered punishment or loss but also out of con:. 
sciously held "respect for" the interpretations.61 There would, then, 
have to be at least one possible fact about a set of human-rights 
prescriptions that would make it possible for everyone to observe 
the interpretations out of respect for them, without regard to any 
adverse institutional consequences of nonobservance. Public and 
certain knowledge that the set of interpretations accords with jus­
tice is not a possible such fact if reasonable interpretative pluralism 
is true. I am aware of only one other possibility. A possible charac­
teristic of the regime, in virtue of which everyone subject to it could 
abide by it out of respect for it, is that the regime's human-rights 
prescriptions are in some way made continuously accountable to 
truly democratic critical re-examination that is fully receptive to 
everyone's perceptions of situation and interest and, relatedly, eve­
ryone's opinion about justice.62 
Notice, though, that a response in this form to someone de­
manding justification for your support of a given constitutional re­
gime, including a contested set of human-rights prescriptions, can 
never be complete. A "truly democratic" process is itself inescap­
ably a legally conditioned and constituted process. It is constituted, 
for example, by laws regarding political representation and elec­
tions, civil associations, freedom of speech, property, access to me­
dia, and so on. Thus, in order to confer legitimacy on a set of laws 
issuing from an actual set of discursive institutions and practices in 
a country, those institutions and practices would themselves have to 
61. See HABERMAS, supra note 56, at 447-48. 
62. For extended discussions of various possible grounds for attributing such a legitimat­
ing virtue to democracy, see Frank Michelman, Democracy and Positive Liberty, BOSTON 
REv., Oct.-Nov. 1996, at 3; Frank I. Michelman, Must Constitutional Democracy be "Respon­
sive?," 107 Ennes (forthcoming July 1997). 
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be legally constituted in the right way. The laws regarding elec­
tions, representation, associations, speech, property, etc., would 
have to be such as to constitute a process of more-or-less "fair" or 
"undistorted" democratic political communication, not only in the 
formal arenas of legislation and adjudication but in civil society at 
large. 
The problem is that whether they do or not may itself at any 
time become a matter of contentious but reasonable disagreement, 
according to the liberal premise of reasonable pluralism. Such disa­
greement, if not honestly and effectively addressed, could lead 
pretty directly to just the sort of ominous decay of legitimacy that 
Jeffrey Rosen observes. The deepest premises of liberalism predict 
that ·possibility, with no help needed from any barbarians at the 
gaie. Liberalism, in other words, can be a coherent political philos­
ophy - if you take it as a challenge and not a catechism. 
